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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate Napoleon Bonaparte’s command and 
control of the Grand Armee through the lens of organizational design.  Napoleon’s 
methodology behind the design of the Grand Armee is analyzed using modern principles 
of organizational design.  The structure that Napoleon created within his organizational 
design was a vast information network that served as the framework for a highly effective 
command and control system.  This command and control network allowed Napoleon to 
dominate a war with his enemies within the information domain. 
The Grand Armee transited the European countryside with lightning speed as 
Napoleon out maneuvered his enemies.  Napoleon’s dominance was a direct result of his 
organizational masterpiece that was the Grand Armee.  From an organizational design 
perspective, Napoleon’s methodology applied the ideas of others and exploited existing 
technology to affect his design. 
The reorganization of the military corps became one of the most important 
transformations made by Napoleon.  The army corps was considered a key component in 
Napoleon’s strategic deployments.  The command and control system he engineered for 
his corps was essential in the Napoleonic philosophy to march divided and fight united. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. HISTORY .........................................................................................................1 
B. OBJECTIVES ..................................................................................................3 
C. THESIS OUTLINE..........................................................................................3 
II. BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................................5 
A. KEY MILITARY CONCEPTS ......................................................................5 
1. Command and Control (C2) ...............................................................5 
2. Infrastructure.......................................................................................6 
3. Army Organization..............................................................................7 
B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ............................................9 
1. Systems Engineering............................................................................9 
2. Information Systems..........................................................................10 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN ...................................................................12 
1. Organizational Design .......................................................................12 
2. Principles of Organizational Design.................................................13 
III. STRUCTURAL MODEL OF NAPOLEON’S ORGANIZATIONAL 
DESIGN ......................................................................................................................17 
A. EVOLUTION OF THE CORPS FORMATION ........................................17 
1. Design Process ....................................................................................17 
2. Corps Design.......................................................................................18 
3. Corps Command and Control Element ...........................................20 
B. IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION .................................21 
1. Maison.................................................................................................22 
2. General Staff.......................................................................................23 
IV. ANALYSIS OF NAPOLEON’S ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN IN KEY 
BATTLES ...................................................................................................................27 
A. THE MANEUVER ON ULM: 20 OCTOBER 1805...................................27 
B. BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ: 2 DECEMBER 1805...................................28 
C. THE BATTLE OF WAGRAM: 5-6 JULY 1809.........................................32 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................37 
A. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................37 
B. FUTURE WORK...........................................................................................40 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................43 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................45 
 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Battle of Austerlitz (Battle of Austerlitz, 2009)..............................................31 
Figure 2.  Battle of Wagram (Battle of Wagram, 2009)..................................................33 
 
 x






















I would like to express my sincere thanks to LtCol Karl Pfeiffer and Mr. Steven 
Iatrou for their support, guidance, advice, and humor during the research and completion 
of this thesis. 
Also, I would like to thank my beloved wife, Andrea, my daughter, Brooke, and 
my dog, Caesar, for their understanding and invaluable support of my endeavors. 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. HISTORY 
Napoleon Bonaparte was undoubtedly one of the greatest military minds of all 
time.  As General, Consul, and Emperor he left an extraordinary record of success on and 
off the battlefields of Europe during the years of 1803-1815.  This twelve-year span of 
Napoleon’s military dominance became known as the Napoleonic Wars (Esdaile, 2007).  
Much has been written on the military tactics, techniques, and procedures developed and 
implemented by this great commander.  Little has been said of his expert use of 
organizational design and the systems he engineered to ensure timely acquisition and 
distribution of essential information.  This thesis explores this area of Napoleon’s 
expertise. 
Napoleon’s appreciation and understanding of the military arts does not come by 
happenstance, his military education started at the age of 9, as he left Corsica and entered 
the French military school system.  Here he was prepared for a career in the artillery.  
Napoleon was provided formal instruction in the rudiments of military science, 
mathematics, history, geography, and German (Horward, 1988).  He spent his formative 
years as an artillery officer until destiny intervened on his behalf.  While in Paris in 
October 1795, Napoleon was called upon to defend the National Convention from a mob 
of 30,000 Parisians (Horward, 1988).  Napoleon was considered a hero of the government 
and was eventually appointed to be the commander of the Army of Italy in March 1796 
(Horward, 1988).  His star continued to rise and he would eventually become the First 
Consul, and later Emperor of the French. 
Napoleon had inherited large conscript armies from the French Revolution.  These 
armies were led by young ambitious commanders, accustomed to a mobile, offensive, 
and ruthless way of war (Rothenberg, 1978).  He would inspire these soldiers with a 
fierce loyalty and devotion to France.  Together they would win unsurpassed victories 
and Napoleon’s strategies, campaigns, and style of command would be studied by 
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soldiers everywhere (Rothenberg, 1978).  Napoleon transformed Europe and laid the 
foundation for the nineteenth century—politically, socially, economically, and militarily 
(Horward, 1988). 
Organizational design is an example of a modern framework with which to make 
a critical examination of this 18th century genius.  An inquiry into Napoleon’s 
methodology of this framework would reveal that he pushed existing technology to the 
limits.  At the same time he made its very limitations work for him.  The effectiveness of 
Napoleon’s organization depended on his ability to successfully disseminate data 
throughout his information network.  Organizations acquire and internally disseminate 
information in order to carry out the critical functions of decision making and control 
(Huber, 1982).  Napoleon utilized the existing technology of the Chappe’s semaphore 
telegraph to improve his message traffic.  He maximized its potential by constructing 
towers across Europe creating a communications web that would cover his expanding 
empire (Elting, 1988).  When messages were too long or not as important to use 
Chappe’s telegraph, Napoleon relied on the European postal system.  He made 
improvements by creating an express courier service.  Messages were carried in a lock 
box with a logbook that showed the date and time of arrivals and departures of couriers to 
each post house (Elting, 1988). 
One of Napoleon’s greatest organizational designs was the versatile corps system.  
Napoleon restructured its organization to contain every facet of an army.  An army of 
150,000 men could be organized into eight numbered corps, each containing every 
element of arms and each provided with a uniformly structured, but not necessarily 
permanent, staff to direct its operations (Van Creveld, 1985). 
The command and control (C2) structure of the corps system developed by 
Napoleon was a simple hierarchical organization with Napoleon as its pinnacle.  The 
corps was deployed such that no one corps was more than a one day march from another.  
Following contemporary military wisdom that no single corps of roughly 28,000 men 
could be overwhelmed in one day, allowing time for reinforcements to arrive in support 
(Elting, 1988).  The smaller well spaced corps system also allowed for ease in logistics 
and foraging the European countryside (Van Creveld, 1985).  Maneuverability of the 
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army was improved as the independent corps could take different paths to a rendezvous 
point.  In contrast, other European military organizations of the day normally deployed 
their armies in mass, taking more time to reach a destination.  Ultimately, this swift 
maneuverability allowed Napoleon to achieve many of his greatest victories (Clausewitz, 
1812/1942).  He was able to out maneuver many of his coalition enemies by isolating 
them and destroying them in detail.  Napoleon’s ability to out maneuver his enemies 
rested on his ability to engineer an organization that could support his innovative ideas. 
This thesis will analyze the organizational design process, specifically how the 
principles of organizational design applied to Napoleon the organizational designer.  
Utilization of these organizational principles coupled with existing technology enabled 
Napoleon to create a vast command and control network that supported his dominance 
over his European contemporaries. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis will investigate the command and control elements developed by 
Napoleon Bonaparte.  The primary area of focus will be on Napoleon as an 
organizational designer.  His mastery of the available technology and resources allowed 
him to achieve his great success on the battlefield.  Through the lens of organizational 
design this thesis will examine the modern areas of organizational theory and design to 
better understand how Napoleon effectively developed his organizational structure.  The 
objective of this thesis will not be to present another historical recount of Napoleon’s 
many triumphs as a military commander.  The intention will be to explore Napoleon’s 
ability to develop organizational structures within the technological and human 
constraints of the period to outmaneuver his opponents. 
C. THESIS OUTLINE 
The remainder of this work is organized as follows.  Chapter II is a review of 
pertinent literature that will provide an overview of some of Napoleon’s military 
engagements to best emphasize his organizational skills and achievements in effective 
command and control.  This chapter will also discuss the basics of systems and 
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information systems engineering and highlight specific principles of organizational 
design.  Chapter III will be a discussion on how Napoleon’s interpretation of information 
systems engineering and organizational design guided his restructuring of the existing 
military corps structure.  Chapter IV will cover the methodology and philosophy behind 
the Napoleon command and control network the benefits of being the ultimate authority 
on the design criteria.  This chapter will also present three military engagements in which 
Napoleon achieved victory as a direct result of his design theory.  Chapter V will be 
conclusions drawn from the analysis made on Napoleon’s ability to apply organizational 
design concepts to command and control.  This chapter will also attempt to present 





This chapter will review important concepts and terminology that are needed to 
understand the organizational design process with respect to Napoleon’s Grand Armee.  
Transformations Napoleon made were not typically the result of creation but 
organization.  He applied what are now considered to be modern principles of 
information systems engineering to the ideas of others.  In addition, this chapter will 
cover key elements of warfare and how they were affected during the time periods of the 
French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815). 
A. KEY MILITARY CONCEPTS 
1. Command and Control (C2) 
No single activity in military operations is more important than command and 
control (DoD, 2006).  Without command and control an army would be subject to 
fighting a battle as a reactionary force unable to effectively maneuver and exploit tactical 
advantages during an engagement.  Command is a function that must be exercised in 
order for an army to exist and operate.  The Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines command and control as, the 
exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned 
and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.  Command and control 
functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, 
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of 
the mission (DoD, 2001). 
The Napoleonic era ushered in a revolution that necessitated an alteration in 
military organizations’ command and control.  The dramatic expansion of armed forces 
through national conscription required a more logical and efficient means of controlling 
armies in the field and on campaign (Bruce et al., 2008).  Napoleon Bonaparte had been 
quick to respond to these revolutionary changes.  Napoleon had a heightened sense of 
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awareness to command and control created from his military training and assignments as 
an artillery officer.  He knew that massed artillery during key moments in a battle could 
very well decide the outcome of that engagement (Clausewitz, 1812/1942).  Decisive and 
effective command and control were paramount in exploiting this tactic on the battlefield.  
Most Napoleon scholars and historians of the period would agree that Napoleon had a 
very keen intellect that was considered by some to be border line genius (Rothenberg, 
1999).  His genius also included a vivid imagination that is present in many of his letters 
that survive to this day (Van Creveld, 1985).  This imagination coupled with his self 
proclaimed love of mathematics and science were invaluable to his systematic 
restructuring of France’s command and control structure. 
2. Infrastructure 
For the purposes of this thesis infrastructure is defined as the basic organizational 
structures needed to sustain a society, this includes roads, waterways, and lines of 
communication.  Basic infrastructure throughout France and Europe had made great 
strides through the eighteenth centruy (Rothenberg, 1978).  Vast amounts of new roads 
and canals were being built which facilitated travel and trade.  A royal mail carrier 
service established in the sixteenth century had increased exponentially during this time 
period.  Napoleon had estimated this allowed information and news to travel twice as fast 
as it had during the age of Caesar (Van Creveld, 1985). 
In 1793, the Frenchman Claude Chappe had demonstrated a practicle use of the 
semaphore telegraph and had established a line from Paris to Lille (Elting, 1988).  This 
telegraph line covered the 150 mile distance with the use of fifteen stations.  In favorable 
weather, one sign could be sent in five minutes.  The time needed to send a message was 
considerably reduced by encoding it so that each sign represented an entire word or 
phrase (Elting, 1988).  This emerging technology was an area in which Napoleon tried to 
improve, as it would serve as a faster means to send and receive data throughout his 
command and control network. 
There were also improvements in the field of cartography.  Maps were now being 
created using mathematical triangulation which improved accuracy of the maps (Van 
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Creveld, 1985).  For the first time ever maps of all sizes and qualities were made readily 
available, effectively improving the strategic planning process for commanders in the 
field.   
Logistical support is a significant area that relies heavily on infrastructure. It saw 
vast improvement with the expanding road and canal systems.  A shift in population 
density increased to the point where most regions could support the foraging of armies. 
Prior to the 18th century, population density’s tended to orbit around major cities.  
However, during the 18th century the population density of the countryside increased to 
the point that many regions could support armies (Van Creveld, 1985). 
Foraging was an accepted method Napoleon’s soldiers used to gather food from a 
surrounding countryside.  In contrast, the act of foraging was strictly forbidden in the 
British army and severely punished by Wellington.  However, on occasion necessity 
forced Wellington and his officers to turn a blind eye to the practice (Rothenberg, 1978).  
The practice had developed into a highly effective system in the French army, and troops 
showed considerable ingenuity in finding supplies (Rothenberg, 1978).  This decreased 
an army’s dependency on magazines and convoys which improved the army’s overall 
mobility (Elting, 1988).  The concept of foraging was paramount for Napoleon’s corps as 
they normally traveled independently, further decreasing the logistics demand from one 
given area. 
3. Army Organization 
One of the elements to Napoleon’s success as a military commander was the 
adaptations he made in the organization of his armies.  Armies of the Napoleonic era 
were roughly organized the same as they are today aside from the weapons and vehicles 
that modern technology has provided.   
Prior to the French Revolution, France’s military was organized much like the 
modern Army National Guard of the United States.  The French military was organized 
into divisions in 1791.  Each division was assigned to a specific region or territory and a 
general officer assigned to each division.  These general officers were responsible for all 
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the troops and fortresses within their divisions and for the preservation of law and order if 
local civil authorities could not handle the situation (Elting, 1988). 
The French Revolution created many social changes within the army.  The title 
and birth right of nobility was forbidden by the National Assembly.  The officer corps 
thoughout Europe primarily consisted of nobles or men who had attained noble stature or 
station (Elting, 1988).  The reorganization of the officer corps within France had actually 
assisted up and coming officers such as Napoleon.  The chaotic conditions of the 
revolution had advanced him in rank well beyond his years.  In fact, the average age of 
the first eighteen marshals was only 44 (Horward, 1988).  Napoleon’s marshals had risen 
through the ranks and were not given assignments based on noble birth as was contrary to 
the European monarchys of the era.  This gave Napoleon an edge as he developed his 
organization.  He realized he could appoint marshals who were risk takers and would not 
shy away from combat.  This advantage came at an extremely high cost as Napoleon 
suffered a higher mortality rate amongst his generals than those of his enemies 
(Rothenberg, 1999).  Eventually, the overall effectiveness of Napoleon’s organization 
was decreased due to attrition of experienced commanders in the field. 
As in today’s military organization the armies of France were organized into 
regiments, brigades, divisions, and corps.  The brigade usually consisted of two or more 
regiments; a division of two or more brigades (Elting, 1988).  The corps became the focal 
point for Napoleon’s organizational adaptation.  The corps system had been previously 
established by France’s National Assembly in 1794.  In 1799, Napoleon consolidated his 
political power becoming First Consul of France.  He began to combine his divisions into 
army corps, a combination of infantry, artillery, and a brigade of cavalry, plus 
detachments of engineers, pontoniers(engineers that build pontoon bridges), and a staff 
(Horward, 1988).  Details and breakdown of the corps sytem will be discussed further in 
Chapter III. 
Another key element of army organization was the general staff corps.  In 1792, 
the French National Assembly started assigning a chief of staff officer to its field armies.  
In particular, Marshal Berthier would excel in this role as he was assigned to the Army of 
the Alps.  The future chief of staff for the Grand Armee, Berthier developed doctrine 
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which provided guidance on how to effectively operate as a General Staff (Van Creveld, 
1985).  The General Staff would serve as the backbone of Napoleon’s organization and 
C2 network.  Berthier would provide the blueprint for all staff officers on how to be an 
effective productive component of Napoleon’s C2 system. 
B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
1. Systems Engineering 
Systems engineering is considered to be a robust approach to the design, creation, 
and operation of systems.  The systems engineering process consists of identification and 
quantification of system goals, creation of alternative system design concepts, 
performance of the design, selection and implementation of the best design, and to verify 
if the design meets the criteria set forth in the goals of the system (NASA, 1995). 
The fundamental goal of systems engineering is problem solving.  The problem 
solving process can be described in three steps: problem system, project system, and 
delivered system (Marvel, 2008). 
The problem system starts with the quantification of the goals, system 
requirements and customer needs (Marvel, 2008).  One of the biggest engineering 
problems facing Napoleon was the scale of the command and control network he set out 
to design.  Prior to his appointment as First Consul of the Republic, he had only 
commanded one corps or roughly 28,000 men.  Napoleon would have to drastically 
expand that network in order to control up to ten times as many soldiers. 
The next step in the problem solving process is the project system.  This is where 
the engineer formulates his strategy for his design, develops, and produces a solution for 
the problem (Marvel, 2008).  In systems engineering this is also referred to as 
methodology.  Napoleon’s Italian campaign of 1796 afforded him the opportunity to 
experiment with the effectiveness of his C2 system.  He organized his one corps into a 
structure he would apply to his design of the Grand Armee (Rothenberg, 1999). 
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The final step in the process is referred to as the delivered system.  This represents 
the finished product which included the testing and verification that the system meets the 
requirements set forth in the design concept (Marvel, 2008).  For Napoleon, verification 
would come at the Battle of Ulm in October of 1805.  The Austrians under General Mack 
would be the first nation to witness the lightning quick efficency with which Napoleon’s 
organization operated. 
Systems engineering also relies on an ability to utilize current technology and 
resources in order to meet the system goals.  Napoleon Bonaparte applied the standard 
systems engineering process when he set out to reorganize the military corps formation.  
His goal for the corps system was to create an organization that could function 
autonomously.  The corps was a self-contained army and C2 network, complete with all 
military elements and led by a marshal and staff corps.  The result of this design impacted 
the command and control of the Grand Armee by improving the flow of information 
throughout his organization. 
2. Information Systems 
Information is simply the influx of data that are relevant, timely, and concise 
(Tushman & Nadler, 1978).  This information effects a change in knowledge.  This 
change in knowledge is the result of information processing.  Information processing is at 
the heart of an effective information systems network.  Tushman and Nadler define 
information processing as the collection, interpreting, and synthesis of information in 
respect to organizational decision making (Tushman & Nadler, 1978). 
Napoleon designed his organization so that he could serve as the nucleus of his 
command and control network.  However, its effectiveness depended on the flow of 
information from his units in the field.  This information flow was regulated by Marshal 
Berthier and the General Staff.  Information was collected and organized by Berthier and 
then forwarded to Napoleon for processing and interpretation.  This step is an integral 
process in an organizational information system.  An organization must acquire, analyze, 
de-conflict, and internally disseminate information in order to carry out critical functions 
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of control and decision making (Huber, 1982).  Chapter III will discuss in detail the 
design and layout of the General Staff and its role in Napoleon’s organization and C2 
structure. 
The term network is defined as an interconnected or interrelated chain, group, or 
system (Network, 2009).  This definition will be used in terms of command and control 
and the information systems that connected related groups within Napoleon’s 
organizational design.  The relationship between the General Staff and the staff corps of 
individual army corps represents a network created by Napoleon’s organizational design.  
The General Staff was responsible for the flow of information within Napoleon’s C2 
structure.  This network depended on a highly organized courier system that delivered 
information to all parts of the empire (Elting, 1988). 
Military intelligence was a major component in Napoleon’s information system.  
The need to gather intelligence has not changed through the evolution of warfare, only 
the means and technology used to gather it.  Intelligence gathering for Napoleon’s 
organization included troop movements, terrain scouting, force size, composition, 
intentions, and unit strength and weaknesses.  Basic intelligence gathering was 
accomplished through a well arranged system of espionage, capturing prisoners, probing 
with cavalry scouts, and intercepting messengers (Jomini, 1862/2007).  Intelligence 
gathering was supervised by an Intelligence Bureau that Napoleon established within his 
Imperial Headquarters.  Unfortunately, many of these operations were only vaguely 
recorded (Elting, 1988). 
Napoleon used his political station as Consul and Emperor as an extension of his 
information network.  The majority of his intelligence came from his diplomatic service, 
every French ambassador had his own spy net and staff, who made friends with loosed-
lipped government officials (Elting, 1988).  Napoleon’s diplomatic service also produced 
intelligence from foreign newspapers as well, finding them most informative.   
In the end, Napoleon’ organization and system of command and control depended 
heavily on a diverse information system.  Napoleon drew his information from many 
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agencies, including the Intelligence Bureau and his system of diplomatic espionage.  This 
information came by many means, and he often paid well for it (Elting, 1988). 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
1. Organizational Design 
Many of today’s theories on organization have their origins in the organizational 
designs created in a military structure (Autry, 1996).  Although this thesis will focus 
more on Napoleon’s ability to restructure his military organization, he was also very 
successful in redistributing responsibilities within his government.  In both facets, 
Napoleon is what Henry Mintzberg refers to as the strategic apex, or top management.  
Napoleon in essence did the hiring and firing of the people to do the basic work of the 
administration (Mintzberg, 1980).  Napoleon made all decisions within his organization 
both militarily and domestically.  From a military point of view, Napoleon acted as his 
own operations officer.  Napoleon often remarked that he required no advice from his 
generals, for he alone knew what he must do (Rothenberg, 1978). 
There are five basic organizational design clusters or configurations.  These 
configurations are the simple structure, machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, 
divisional form, and adhocracy (Mintzberg, 1980).  Napoleon’s organizational design 
falls primarily within the definitions of the simple structure and the machine 
bureaucracy.   
The simple structure is the baseline for all of the organizational design structures.  
As its name suggests, there is not very much involved in this structure.  It is defined as 
one large unit consisting of one or a few top managers and a group of operators who 
perform the basic work (Mintzberg, 1980).  Looking at Napoleon’s organization through 
a lens of organizational design reveals a simple structure.  This structure is evident with 
Napoleon representing the apex.  His top managers consisted of his General Staff, and 
then Napoleon’s marshals and their respective staff corps.  The simple structure functions 
most effectively in an environment where one man is making all decisions and requires 
minimum assistance to distribute and carry out orders.  Napoleon as a supreme 
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commander often held an advantage over his Coalition adversaries who were often 
without a unity of command.  This often allowed Napoleon to react more quickly to 
tactical situations while his enemies wasted time deciding amongst themselves what 
action to take.  Chapter III will discuss what elements of Napoleon’s design can be most 
represented by the simple structure configuration. 
The machine bureaucracy is often associated with the industrial revolution and its 
standardization of work for coordination and its resulting low-skilled, highly specialized 
jobs (Mintzberg, 1980).  The Napoleonic structure was very standardized from the very 
day to day schedule the man kept, to the manner in which Marshal Berthier ran the 
general staff.  Standardization was the key in the development of the standing armies of 
the day.  High attrition rates from Napoleon’s campaigns meant that new recruits were 
constantly refilling the ranks (Elting, 1988).  Standardization within the command 
structure, i.e. staff corps assigned to each corps allowed for the continued ebb and flow of 
daily operations within the unit, in addition to the supervision of drills and training for the 
new recruits (Elting, 1988).  When viewing Napoleon’s design from the modern lens of 
organizational design it must be noted that his simple structure contained the 
standardization element of the machine bureaucracy.  
2. Principles of Organizational Design 
The organizational process begins with the creation of a strategy or objective.  
The strategy is derived from clear, concise statements of purpose and vision from the 
organization’s philosophy (Autry, 1996).  The strategy should utilize the five basic 
principles of organizational design: division of labor, unity of command, authority and 
responsibility, spans of control, and contingency factors. 
The division of labor covers the departmentalization of the men and women who 
work for the organization (Sharma, 1995).  For Napoleon, this illustrates how he divided 
his various divisions to create his corps system.  These new departments (corps) now 
required the second component of division of labor, specialization.  Specialized workers 
were needed in order to operate in Napoleon’s organization.  A classic example would be 
the mobile artillery units created by Napoleon to bring field artillery pieces expeditiously 
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to points in the line for defence or to spearhead a charge in the enemy’s line.  This 
specific division of labor was paramount in the Napoleonic tactic of massing artillery to 
achieve maximum firepower (Clausewitz, 1812/1942).  This required a new 
specialization requirement for a member of the cavalry as well as the artilleryman.  New 
specialized troops meant new training requirements.  Napoleon was able to train his 
troops on the proper allocation of this tactic during the two years he spent forming the 
Grand Armee in northern France (1803-1805) (Elting, 1988). 
The unity of command principle establishes a chain of command.  Napoleon 
designed his organization such that he maintained a role as an ultimate authority.  
Napoleon’s contemporaries amongst his enemies often had to operate in an environment 
without unity of command.  Napoleon never had to contend with his decisions affecting 
the national interests of his allies.  Napoleon’s allies were normally satellite states of his 
empire and therefore subject to his decisions (Howard, 1988).  From a military 
perspective, the upper echelon chain of command consisted of the corps Field Marshals, 
then Napoleon’s chief of staff (Marshal Berthier), and finally Napoleon.  The success in 
the unity of command relied heavily on the strategic apex concept (Sharma, 1995). 
The next principle is authority and responsibility.  Napoleon was obviously the 
ultimate authority.  However, Napoleon had to grant his Marshals command by negation 
in many instances due to proximity of their units.  Although, it was the marshal’s 
responsibility to report his movements to the General Staff, they had to exercise 
autonomous authority from time to time in order to achieve the goals set forth in 
Napoleon’s orders.   
Napoleon had developed a trust in the majority of his marshals through serving 
with many of them in his early campaigns in Italy and Egypt prior to the formation of the 
Grand Armee.  Through the specialized training that occurred during the build-up of the 
Grand Armee, Napoleon’s confidence in his commanders increased (Elting, 1988).  They 
conducted drills that emphasized the Napoleonic way of war.  Through strategic and 




situation appropriately.  Although ultimate responsibility lay with the Emperor, Napoleon 
never hesitated to hold one of his generals responsible for the failure to carry out his 
orders successfully.   
Spans of control refer to the levels of authority delegated to the various 
management positions within Napoleon’s organizational structure.  For example, 
Napoleon would often grant his aides-de-camp authority to speak on his behalf (Elting, 
1988).  These aides-de-camp had the complete trust of their emperor through years of 
service and were hand selected.  In some instances Napoleon even required them to go 
into the field to relieve a general of his command.  This was the case at the Battle of 
Wagram in which Napoleon had Marshal Bernadotte relieved for abandoning the town of 
Aderklaa (Horward, 1988). 
The last principle of organizational design is called the contingency factors 
(Sharma, 1995).  The environment and weather are two contingency factors that armies 
are always faced with.  One of the keys to Napoleon’s success was the ability of his 
organization to adapt to its environment.  Some elements of the Grand Armee had been 
with Napoleon since his Egyptian Campaign of 1798.  Many had survived plague in 
Egypt and starvation during Napoleon’s earlier campaigns in Italy.  The resilience of the 
Grand Armee was always a source of confidence for Napoleon who was never afraid to 
push his men to their physical limits.  In fact, much of the success of the Grand Armee 
was due to their ability to cover great distances in short periods of time (Bruce et al., 
2008). 
This chapter has served as an avenue to highlight key terms and concepts in 
regards to the command and control of the Grand Armee as they relate to organizational 
design.  The components of Napoleon’s information network were engineered to 
capitalize on improvements made in France’s infrastructure. 
Napoleon utilized concepts of modern organizational design and systems 
engineering centuries before they became areas of academia.  These modern concepts 
help to gain understanding of how Napoleon restructured the Grand Armee.  During this 
process he also created a highly effective command and control network.  The schematic 
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he created became fashionably popular and his organizational model has been analyzed 
and applied through the generations.  Chapter III will analyze how modern methods of 









III. STRUCTURAL MODEL OF NAPOLEON’S 
ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
A. EVOLUTION OF THE CORPS FORMATION 
The corps formation became the cornerstone of Napoleon’s Grand Armee and a 
major component of his organizational design.  The corps consists of two or more 
infantry divisions, a brigade or division of light cavalry, artillery batteries, and a 
detachment of engineers and support troops (Rothenberg, 1978).  The corps organization 
was originally adopted by France’s National Assembly in 1794.  The system had been 
experimentally used by one of Napoleon’s chief rivals, General Jean Victor Marie 
Moreau, who initially helped Napoleon to power, but was later exiled to America (Elting, 
1988).  By 1800, Napoleon began the design process that would restructure his military 
divisions into army corps (corps d’ armee). 
1. Design Process 
The organizational design process begins with the creation of a strategy.  For 
Napoleon, that strategy was to create a standing army that was swift and versatile.  This 
army would consist of numerous self-contained army corps.  These units had to have the 
capability to maneuver effectively when detached from the centralized command of 
Napoleon.  However, the centralized command required the need to maintain an effective 
command and control network in order to redirect forces when Napoleon deemed it 
necessary.  The birth of the Grand Armee can be set in May, 1803, when England 
repudiated the Treaty of Amiens and declared war on France (Elting, 1988).  Napoleon 
responded by concentrating large forces, designated as the Army of England, in camps 
along the English Channel and the North Sea. 
The strategy in the design process must be derived from clear, concise statements 
of purpose and vision.  The strategy helps to unify the intent of the organization and 
focuses soldiers toward actions designed to accomplish desired outcomes (Autry, 1996).  
These armies had become battle hardened through campaigns in Italy along with those 
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who returned with Napoleon from the Egyptian campaign.  In order to provide his 
organization with a purpose and vision, Napoleon sought to instill pride in his troops, 
love for the Republic, and share in his vision to rid Europe of the established monarchies 
(Esdaile, 2007).  The monarchies of Europe who constantly tried to undermind 
Napoleon’s rule and return the House of Bourbon to the throne of France (Esdaile, 2007). 
While waiting to invade England the troops stationed in northern France received 
intensive training on new tactics and equipment.  Napoleon’s men were trained in the 
maneuvering strategy of the army corps.  Here Napoleon’s soldiers learned how to march 
divided and fight united, which would become another Napoleonic way of war (Bruce et 
al., 2008).   
For nearly three years the army drilled and maneuvered giving the command 
element a chance to become more proficient with the newly organized corps.  Many of 
the new tactics were small unit maneuvers.  This gave Napoleon’s organization a chance 
to become more proficient in C2.  These tactics developed from Napoleon’s new corps 
design, and had been tested on a smaller scale in Italy and Egypt (Bruce et al., 2008).   
Eventually, a shortage of adequate sea transportation and artillery would deter 
Napoleon from an invasion of England.  From 1805, the Army of England became known 
as the Grand Armee (Horward, 1988). 
The manifestation of the Grand Armee had been Napoleon’s visionary design for 
a military organization.  He had already achieved absolute political power in France.  As 
an absolute autocrat, there would not be any other competing authority in France with the 
Grand Armee under his command (Rothenberg, 1978). 
2. Corps Design 
Napoleon institutionalized the corps organization for strategic and tactical 
purposes.  The object was to engineer a smaller more maneuverable force which 
contained all facets of an organized army.  The reorganization of the corps became the 
foundation with which Napoleon set himself apart from his contemporaries.  From 
Napoleon’s perspective, command and control issues were accomplished by maintaining 
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an effective messaging system (Elting, 1988).  His messaging system consisted of an 
elaborate courier system that included lock boxes and a travel log to track the movements 
of the couriers.  Napoleon insured that his generals were well informed of his intentions.  
By accomplishing this, Napoleon’s army had a heightened state of situational awareness. 
Good situational awareness increased the effectiveness of his organization by 
allowing his field commanders to decide how to best prepare for an upcoming 
engagement.  In contrast, most of the conscripted armies of Europe travelled in mass 
which eased the burden of command and control (Clausewitz, 1812/1942).  Many 
Coalition commanders were not as forthcoming with information to their subordinates, 
thus limiting their situational awarness and commander’s intent.   
A typical corps in the Grand Armee consisted of around 28,000 infantry, 1,400 
cavalry, plus its artillerymen, engineering corps, and staff corps (Elting, 1988).  Napoleon 
engineered this organization to move autonomously and be able to meet and defeat an 
enemy of equal strength.  He deployed his corps so that no one corps was further than a 
one day march from another.  This concept was built around the premise that one of his 
corps could engage a superior enemy force and hold them at bay until reinforcements had 
arrived (Clausewitz, 1812/1942).  Napoleon depended on well developed lines of 
communication to pass news along whenever one of his corps engaged the enemy.  
Napoleon often enlisted allied forces to garrison cities and towns that he conquered in 
order to protect his lines of communication (Horward, 1988).  By creating a standardized 
organization whereby each corps was roughly interchangeable and able to exchange 
roles, Napoleon enhanced his strategic level of performance.  Instead of being an army in 
mass, the Grand Armee was able to spread its corps a distance of fifteen to thirty miles 
from each other to avoid traffic control and supply problems (Van Creveld, 1985).  
Whenever the road permitted it, the corps would march in three or four columns to allow 
more rapid maneuver and deployment able to seek out, accept, or avoid combat as its 
commander chose (Elting, 1988). 
Napoleon’s corps design follows the first principle in organizational design, 
division of labor (Sharma, 1995).  The Grand Armee was departmentalized into each 
individual army corps, each with its own staff and Field Marshal.  Napoleon required a 
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specialized labor force within his organization to lead his army corps.  During the build 
up to invade England, Napoleon had the opportunity to remove any undesriables in his 
officer corps which he felt were not capable leaders (Elting, 1988).  The French 
Revolution had removed any prerequisite of noble blood or station to become a member 
of the officer corps.  Napoleon wasted little time in promoting deserving leaders to direct 
his units, as all his future marshals shared one quality, conspicuous bravery (Rothenberg, 
1978). 
These specialized leaders were responsible for training their individual corps to 
maneuver and fight in the corps formation.  The corps organization consisted of many 
other skilled laborers, including the vaunted mobile artillery units.  Napoleon utilized 
specialized cavalry units to haul light weight cannons around during an engagement.  
These units were paramount in his overall organizational strategy as the could deliver 
needed artillery support to spearhead an advance, or be relocated to break up an 
impending cavalry charge into the flank (Jomini, 1862/2007).  These units required a 
laborer who was specialized in artillery as well as horsemanship.  One unique quality of 
Napoleon’s corps was that they were theoretically interchangeable, therefore one artillery 
brigade from one corps could be reassigned to another without missing a beat.  This fact 
illustrates the importance of specialization and standardization within the workforce of 
Napoleon’s machine bureaucracy.  These interchangeable parts helped to prevent a 
breakdown in Napoleon’s organizational design. 
3. Corps Command and Control Element 
The command and control of the corps formation was a crucial element in 
Napoleon’s organizational design.  In terms of organizational design, the C2 network 
consisted of a unity of command which established Napoleon as its apex (Sharma, 1995).  
As the apex, Napoleon followed the concept of one superior with no peers to question his 
decisions.  This concept meant that decisions could be made quickly and without conflict 




A line of command was established that allowed the flow of information from 
Napoleon through his chief of staff, Marshal Berthier, to Berthier’s adjutants, then to the 
individual corps staff, and finally the corps’ marshal.  The corps commander was 
responsible for sending and receiving information from his brigade commanders.  In 
order for this to be a successful information network, the flow of information had to be 
maintained in both directions.  When this portion of Napoleon’s organization remained 
intact, victory was usually the outcome of the engagement. 
As head of state and supreme military commander, Napoleon had distinct  
advantages in maintaining control of planning and operations.  It is important to note that 
his command and control system never changed even as his command grew from 50,000 
men to 400,000 (Rothenberg, 1978). 
Napoleon laid the foundation for modern organizational design concepts in order 
to create an effective C2 element for his corps formation.  This C2 element was highly 
dependent on the organizational and leadership skills of the members of the staff, and 
General Staff corps.   
B. IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION 
Although Napoleon was the apex in his organization, he relied heavily on those 
around him for the flow of information.  If Napoleon is the brains of the organization, 
then the imperial headquarters would be its central nervous system.  Napoleon the 
organizational designer was the architect of an imperial headquarters designed to fit the 
simple structure, with elements of a machine bureaucracy; he had created (Mintzberg, 
1980). 
Napoleon divided his headquarters up into three parts: the Emperor’s Maison, the 
General Staff, and the Administration headquarters (Van Creveld, 1985).  Each of these 
independent tiers reported directly to Napoleon and were each vital to the success of his 
organization.  However, the Maison and the General Staff offer the best examples of 
Napoleon’s talents as an organizational designer. 
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1. Maison 
The meaning of the term Maison was a lingering word from the Middle Ages that 
meant “household” (Elting, 1988).  As the name indicates, it was basically the part of the 
king’s household that accompanied him on campaign.  It was revived by Napoleon while 
he was Consul.  In 1806, it consisted of around 800 grooms, valets, pages, cooks, and 
personal bodyguards (Van Creveld, 1985).  The Maison was also comprised of his 
personal staff and aides-de-camp.  The imperial aides-de-camp were hand-picked soldiers 
who were capable commanders that could lead any force of arms.  The aides-de-camp 
were an intricate part of Napoleon’s information system.  They were authorized to speak 
in the Emperor’s name and were often detached from the Grand Armee on particular 
important missions of state (Elting, 1988). 
Napoleon entrusted two men with the responsibility of the Maison.  General 
Geraud Duroc was overall in charge and handled many diplomatic missions for 
Napoleon.  General Armand Caulaincourt was responsible for the Emperor’s travelling 
arrangements.  His duties also included accompanying Napoleon on reconnaissance and 
during battles to dictate any orders that Napoleon would issue (Van Creveld, 1985). 
Within the Maison was the Emperor’s cabinet, which had three main divisions, 
Intelligence, Topographical Bureau, and the Secretariat.  Two of these cabinet positions 
were paramount to Napoleon’s information system, Intelligence, and the Secretariat. 
The Intelligence cabinet gathered and collected information from its espionage 
network of spies and agents of French ambassadores.  They were also responsible for 
translating foreign newspapers as well as monitioring the situation in Paris while the 
Emperor was away (Elting, 1988). 
The Secretariat consisted of shorthand secretaries, librarians, and archivists, 
whose responsibility it was to dictate for the Emperor.  This included another key 
element of the information system, the state newspaper.  Napoleon would dictate to his 




included reporting favorable causalty numbers from a victory (Elting, 1988).  This 
serving again as emphasis that Napoleon had engineered his organization with himself as 
its apex. 
2. General Staff 
Once Napoleon organized the Grand Armee into a highly versatile organization, 
he then centralized his control through his General Staff, and its chief, Marshal Berthier.  
Berthier directed a general staff which included a large number of knowledgeable officers 
who provided all manner of information requested by Napoleon.  Berthier’s aides 
provided information on types of roads, layouts of towns, and the quality of equipment 
carried by enemy units (Horward, 1988). 
In 1796, while serving in the Army of the Alps, Berthier had created a document 
that highlighted his duties as chief of staff.  Berthier would divide the responsibilites of 
the General Staff into four sections, and assign an adjutant general to each section (Van 
Creveld, 1985).  The chief of staff’s duties consisted of maintaining situation reports, 
dispatching orders, mainatining an army’s war diary, maintaining maps, keeping 
registers, and conducting inspections.  Berthier also emphasized that all correspondance 
that leaves the staff office must come from the chief of staff as he is the central point for 
all operations (Elting, 1988).  In the absence of the chief of staff he would issue special 
orders authorizing one of the adjutant generals to send out orders on his behalf (Van 
Creveld, 1985). 
This staff organization was standardized throughout the Grand Armee.  The same 
functions applied to the staff officers at the corps level as they provided for their 
individual marshal.  A highly successful example of this relationship developed between 
Marshal Ney and his chief of staff, Antoine-Henri Jomini (Rothenberg, 1978).  This 
standardization provided symmetry to Napoleon’s organization and C2 network. 
Eventhough Napoleon built his staff corps from an excellent pool of trusted 
officers, he remained his own operations officer and continued to make all decisions.  
Marshal Berthier did not participate in the planning process of the Emperor.  In 1806, 
Napoleon had instructed Berthier to “adhere strictly to my commands.  I alone know 
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what I have to do” (Rothenberg, 1978).  Berthier proved to be a quick learner has he in 
turn told Marshal Ney in 1807, “the emperor needs neither advice nor plans of campaign.  
No one knows his thoughts and our duty is to obey” (Rothenberg, 1978). 
There was not a written standard operating procedure for Napoleon’s 
headquarters, just customs that had long been engrained into the General Staff (Elting, 
1988).  Berthier had developed a correspondance system within Napoleon’s command 
organization.  All military correspondance went through Berthier, even instances where 
aides-de-camp or marshals were to report directly to Napoleon, they had to provide 
Berthier with his copy of the correspondance (Elting, 1988).  Berthier often encoded and 
decoded messages for the Emperor, either sent or received via telegraph, or by courier.  
Orders were sent out as multiple copies each one proof read by Berthier before they were 
sent to Napoleon for release authority.  One copy of the order was also filed away in the 
headquarters archive. 
Orders were normally sent via multiple couriers taking different routes in case one 
was intercepted.  Courier’s were required to receive a reciept from the corps staff once 
they delivered the correspondance, this provided a means to ensure Napoleon’s orders 
were delivered (Van Creveld, 1985).  In terms of information processing, this was the 
movement of information in a timely fashion, and transmission without distortion 
(Tushman & Nadler, 1978). 
Marshal Berthier and the General Staff had to keep up with Napoleon’s schedule, 
sometimes the Emperor would not sleep on the eve an engagement.  However, most 
nights he went to bed around 7:00 pm and would wake up around midnight or 1:00 am 
(Elting, 1988).  This was usually the time reports would start to arrive and had been 
processed by the General Staff.  This gave Napoleon the time to study his reports and 
maps and issue the days marching orders.  Berthier would check them again after they 




The General Staff served as a data hub for the information system within 
Napoleon’s organizational design.  Although Napoleon made all decisions he clearly 
could not have managed his organization on his own.  Marshal Berthier was masterful in 
his organization and attention to detail.  This attention to detail greatly increased the 
effectiveness of the entire staff corps of the Grand Armee and ultimately the entire 
organization. 
The structural model of the Napoleonic organizational design depended on 
Napoleon’s restructuring of the military corps formation.  The corps formation became 
the military backbone of the Grand Armee.  The extent of Napoleon’s information 
network is evident in the command and control system of the corps.  This chapter also 
explored the inside of Napoleon’s Imperial Headquarters, and how it served as the key 
structure in controlling the manpower within the organization created by Napoleon.  
Chapter IV will provide historical military accounts of the effectiveness of Napoleon’s 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF NAPOLEON’S ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
IN KEY BATTLES 
The Grand Armee had spent two years training in northern France for an invasion 
of England (Elting, 1988).  During these two years Napoleon and his General Staff were 
able to exercise the C2 network within the organization that Napoleon designed.  Small 
unit tactics were emphasized at the corps level.  Individual Marshals drilled and 
maneuvered the divisions and brigades within their corps (Elting, 1988). 
In 1805, British Prime Minister William Pitt successfully persuaded Austria and 
Russia to join the British in the Third Coalition (Horward, 1988).  Napoleon’s Grand 
Armee swept across France and into Germany to confront Austria before her coalition 
partners could join her against France.  Napoleon now had the opportunity to showcase 
his organization  The success of the Grand Armee would depend on how well this 
organizational design functioned in war. 
A. THE MANEUVER ON ULM: 20 OCTOBER 1805 
One of Napoleon’s greatest victories was not actually a battle of epic proportions 
but a strategic maneuver that would become a hallmark of the Napoleonic way of war.  
The maneuver emphasizes the agility of Napoleon’s C2 network and the extraordinary 
speed at which his organization could function.   
In response to the Austrian invasion of Bavaria on September 9th, Bonaparte sent 
out his marching orders to seven corps of the Grand Armee (Howard, 1988).  The corps 
were detached and moved along parallel roads across France.  Five of the seven corps, or 
about 120,000 men, marched from Pas-de-Calais and Holland to the German frontier in 
30 days, a distance of some 500 miles (Bruce et al., 2008).  This feat optimized the well 
developed infrastructure within France.  Napoleon utilized the roads to spread out and 
expand his command and control network. 
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Speed was usually the key to Napoleon’s success, as he was almost always 
outnumbered by the coalitions formed against him (Clausewitz, 1812/1942).  His move 
against the Third Coalition exemplifies this point.  Napoleon had to react quickly to 
dispatch General Karl Mack’s Austrian forces before he was reinforced by Archduke 
Charles who had a larger Austrian force headed toward Northern Italy (Rothenberg, 
1978).  A large Russian army was also on the move and headed toward Bavaria which 
would have given the Third Coalition a definite numerical superiority.   
The Grand Armee was assisted by the many princes in Bavaria who provided 
food and fodder for Napoleon’s troops (Bruce et al., 2008).  This alliance with the 
Bavarian princes was a product of Napoleon the statesman, who added these resources to 
the collective organization of the Grand Armee. 
In the space of four weeks, a series of well coordinated, tough marches had 
surrounded General Mack and his 50,000 Austrians in the city of Ulm.  Napoleon utilized 
his cavalry forces under Marshal Murat to provide a screen near the Black Forest, which 
was traditionally the French invasion point into the region (Rothenberg, 1999).  This 
screen provided a stream of bad data that was received by Mack as he deployed his 
defenses in support of this area.  Napoleon took advantage of the exploitation of his 
enemy’s information network.  While Murat feigned in the south, the Grand Armee 
crossed the Rhine to the north and completed a strategic envelopment of Ulm (Horward, 
1988).  This maneuver had isolated Mack from the remaining Austrian forces as well as 
the Russian army some 180 km away from Ulm.  On 20 October 1805, General Mack 
was forced to surrender to the French. 
This example highlights the effectiveness and agility of the command and control 
structure that Napoleon’s organizational design provided.  This maneuver features a 
Napoleonic philosophy to march divided and fight united.  Napoleon’s soldiers noted 
that, “the Emperor makes war not with our arms but with our legs” (Rothenberg, 1999). 
B. BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ: 2 DECEMBER 1805 
The battle of Austerlitz is considered by many to have been Napoleon’s most 
decisive and dramatic victory.  The first field test of Napoleon’s organizational design 
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had been a success at Ulm.  His information network provided him with intelligence that 
his Grand Armee was still numerically inferior to the combined forces of the Third 
Coalition.  Napoleon knew he had to achieve another decisive victory while the coalition 
was divided (Horward, 1988). 
After his precision maneuver to defeat General Mack at Ulm, Napoleon sent his 
army across southern Bavaria and into Austria (Horward, 1988).  His intelligence 
network provided him with vital information on enemy positions.  Napoleon learned that 
Russian general Mikhail Kutusov’s advance force of 36,000 had joined an Austrian force 
of 20,000 men.  The Russian Tsar, Alexander I was close with another 30,000 Russian 
troops and still making his way from northern Italy was Austria’s Archduke Charles with 
a force of 90,000 (Rothenberg, 1978).  Further threatening the French advance, the 
Prussians had decided to join the Coalition and were on the move from Bohemia (Bruce 
et al., 2008).  Again, Napoleon was faced with the situation of fighting against a 
numerically superior force.   
The Grand Armee had been spread thin as it moved across Bavaria, having to 
occupy Ulm and the Austrian capital of Vienna.  Vienna had been captured by Marshal 
Murat and his cavalry on 12 November (Horward, 1988).  The nature of Napoleon’s 
system required that the corps travel separately in order to effectively forage for food.  
Utilizing his intelligence resources, Napoleon calculated the time distance for Archduke 
Charles and his forces to arrive on the scene (Rothenberg, 1978).  Napoleon had to either 
retreat back to Ulm or achieve a decisive victory once again by attacking his enemies 
separately. 
Napoleon had fewer than 55,000 men concentrated for battle at the time he set his 
plan in motion.  The emperor’s information network within his organizational design 
provided him with the means to effectively dispatch riders.  They were to inform 
Marshals Davout and Bernadotte that they were to engage their corps on a forced march 
to support Napoleon at Austerlitz by 2 December (Bruce et al., 2008).  The arrival of 
Davout and Bernadotte would increase Napoleon’s forces to at least 70,000.  The 
emperor would still have to contend with a numerically superior force of 89,000 Russians 
and Austrians. 
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Napoleon’s strategy involved creating an illusion that his army was inferior in 
numbers, equipment, and supplies (Horward, 1988).  Napoleon wanted to entice the 
Russian and Austrian force now led by Alexander to attack before the rest of the allied 
contingent arrived.  Napoleon had even sent one of his aide-de-camps to negotiate an 
armistice to further advertise French weakness and need for time to consolidate 
(Horward, 1988).  This move further emboldened Alexander who ordered the advance 
from Olmutz toward the French camps around Austerlitz.  Alexander ignored the advice 
from General Kutusov that they should wait for the arrival of Archduke Charles (Bruce et 
al., 2008). 
As the coalition forces advanced on Austerlitz, Napoleon ordered the withdrawal 
of Marshal Soult’s corps from the strategically important Pratzen Heights.  Napoleon’s 
move to give up the high ground was against all conventional military wisdom (Jomini, 
1862/2007).  However, this move also helped to support the illusion that his forces were 
too weak to defend an assault.  In fact, Napoleon only maintained a force of around 
10,000 men below the Heights, which became his right flank (Bruce et al., 2008).  As 
expected the Russians and Austrians occupied the Pratzen Heights and made preparations 
to attack Napoleon’s weak right flank.  The allies had now unknowingly adopted the 
exact plan that Napoleon had encouraged with the deployment of his forces (Horward, 
1988). 
The effective command and control of the Grand Armee that resulted from 
Napoleon’s organizational designing prowess was again on display.  The forced march 
order had brought Davout up from Vienna.  He was now moving close enough to too 
support Soult on the morning of 2 December, when the Russian would begin their assault 
from Pratzen Heights (see Figure 1).  Marshal Bernadotte’s movement orders put him in 
a position to reinforce the left flank where Napoleon was planning his offensive.   
On the eve of battle, Napoleon’s information network included local peasants who 
reported to the emperor on the terrain and enemy troop deployments.  Napoleon rode 
along his positions amidst a torchlight procession amid cheers from his men as he praised 
them for their skills as soldiers and strength as men (Horward, 1988). 
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Figure 1.    Battle of Austerlitz (Battle of Austerlitz, 2009) 
As forecasted, the Russians troops advanced on Napoleon’s perceived right flank.  
To further conceal the ruse, a morning fog had helped conceal Davout’s approaching 
force (Rothenberg, 1978).  As the Russians attacked they were increasingly slowed by 
Davout’s advancing force.  The Austrian forces on the Pratzen Heights moved down to 
enforce the Russian advance.  The trap had been sprung.  Napoleon unleashed his attack 
from the left flank that contained the bulk of his army (Bruce et al., 2008).  Napoleon 
advanced up the now lightly defended Pratzen Heights and swept in behind the bulk of 




maneuver crushed his enemies.  By 3:00 pm, 15,000 Russian and Austrian soldiers lay 
dead on the field of Austerlitz, and another 12,000 had been taken prisoner (Horward, 
1988). 
Through proper application of Napoleon’s organizational design coupled with his 
understanding of his enemies C2 network, Napoleon orchestrated a series of maneuvers 
that exploited his enemy’s errors.  As the apex of his organization, his personal 
supervison assured exact timing for his counter attack orders that were distributed 
through his command and control network.   
Napoleon was similar to Frederick the Great in that both were the military and 
political leader of their state.  In effect, Napoleon’s personal decisions translated into a 
dedication of the state to achieve the ends by whatever means he deemed necessary.  As 
was often the case, the Allied Coalitions that fought against Napoleon often had differnet 
political agendas (Van Creveld, 1985).  The Russians and Austrians did not posess the 
unity of command that Napoleon enjoyed.  Agreements had to be made amongst the 
coalition in order to act, often wasting precious time that was exploited by Napoleon and 
ultimately led to his magnificent victory at Austerlitz (Horward, 1988). 
C. THE BATTLE OF WAGRAM: 5-6 JULY 1809 
Wagram was the largest European battle in terms of numbers to date (Bruce et al., 
2008).  The Grand Armee was fighting against the Austrians once again as part of the 
Fifth Coalition formed against Napoleon.  Archduke Charles finally had faced Napoleon 
on the battlefield and handed the emperor a defeat in May of 1809 at the battles of 
Aspern-Essling.  The Archduke famously defended his side of the Danube River while 
Napoleon attempted to cross to the south.  One corps of Napoleon’s troops had been 
isolated as Austrian troops sent barges down the Danube that destroyed bridges as 
Napoleon’s men crossed (Horward, 1988).  Napoleon was forced to withdraw to his side 
of the Danube.  Not too be discouraged by this set back, Napoleon tapped the resources 
of his information system once again.  Inside the imperial headquarters Napoleon set his 
staff to work preparing marching orders for French corps spread across Europe to 
concentrate around Vienna (Horward, 1988).   
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Figure 2.    Battle of Wagram (Battle of Wagram, 2009) 
Troops were on the move from as far away as Italy, Spain, and Dalmatia.  
Napoleon even employed German auxiliaries to guard his lines of communication back to 
France (Bruce et al., 2008).  Napoleon had learned from his defeat at Aspern-Essling.  He 
meticulously began to formulate a plan that would supply enough bridges to cross the 
Danube more expeditiously.  Within Napoleon’s General Staff, the staff corps of 
engineers began to construct three permanent bridges across the Danube.  His engineers 
then prepared 12 pontoon bridges (Bruce et al., 2008). 
By July, elements of the Grand Armee increased from 60,000 to 160,000 in the 
vicinity of Vienna (Horward, 1988).  Napoleon had successfully optimized his C2 




Napoleon as the apex of his organization began to inform his marshals of his plan 
to traverse the river.  This time he had planned for every contingency as he established 
several diversionary points of attack.  The battle occurred over a 10 mile area and 
illustrated once again the agility and efficiency of Napoleon’s Grand Armee.  The battle 
serves as an excellent example of the command and control of the Grand Armee.  
Napoleon coordinated through his marshals the redeployment of three corps comprised of 
72,000 infantry, 9200 cavalry and 280 cannon across the Danube River in just twelve 
hours.  The unopposed crossing of the Danube came courtesy of the diversionary attack 
on the Austrian force across the river further to the north (Bruce et al., 2008).  A tactical 
maneuver made possible by successful execution within Napoleon’s C2 structure. 
Archduke Charles was woken at 4 a.m. on 5 July to find the bulk of Napoleon’s 
army beginning the battle of Wagram (Horward, 1988).  During the battle, Napoleon’s 
information network proved far superior to that of his enemy.  He coordinated counter 
attacks against his left flank, even marching Marshal Massena’s corps parallel to the 
enemy line.  This dangerous move had quickly reinforced his left flank and preserved 
Napoleon’s victory (Horward, 1988).  However, this maneuver left a hole in the French 
lines that was exploited by the Austrians.  As they began to attack this hole, Napoleon 
coordinated a devastating massed artillery barrage of 112 cannon (Horward, 1988).  The 
massing of artillery to achieve maximum firepower was yet another important 
Napoleonic way of war (Clausewitz, 1812/1942).   
This victory for Napoleon forced Archduke Charles to sign an armistice, 
culminating in the Treaty of Schonbrunn in October 1809 (Horward, 1988).  The results 
of Wagram reflected on Napoleon’s ability to maintain an efficient C2 system during the 
course of an engagement.  Archduke Charles was an effective general having been the 
first commander to defeat Napoleon in ground combat.  However, his command and 
control was ineffective as the Archduke rarely made his intentions known to his 
subordinates at the outset of an engagement (Bruce et al., 2008).  In contrast, Napoleon 
made all decisions in the course of a campaign but always made sure that his 
subordinates were well informed of his intentions. 
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These three battles explored the successes achieved through the versatility of 
Napoleon’s organizational design.  First, the Grand Armee’s ability to march divided and 
fight united could only have been achieved with a highly effective command and control 
network.  Napoleon achieved many of his victories through well orchestrated strategic 
deployment of his corps.  In contrast, his adversaries often travelled as a much larger 
force which made them more cumbersome and easier to track. 
The key to Napoleon’s victories became Napoleon himself, as he was the apex 
and mastermind of his information network.  As the Duke of Wellington famously 
remarked that, “Napoleon’s hat on the battlefield was worth 40,000 men” (Rothenberg, 
1999).  Napoleon maintained his status as the ultimate authority on all decisions made 
within his empire.  However, he was able to decentralize his command by exercising 
command by negation with his Marshals and the General Staff.  Napoleon kept his 
commanders well informed of his intentions through an effective messaging system.  
This allowed his Marshals a certain level of autonomy when proceeding on the duties 
assigned by Napoleon.  The Battles of Austerlitz and Wagram have shown that his 
opponents seldomly shared their strategic or tactical plans with their subordinates. 
The success of Napoleon’s command and control and the fighting competency of 
the Grand Armee was often directly related to the proximity of Napoleon.  The next 
chapter will consider possible further research  For example, how did Napoleon’s 
organizational design and C2 system fair when the emperor was not the on scene 
commander?  In addition, what conclusions were drawn from analyzing Napoleon’s 
command and control of the Grand Armee through a modern perspective of 
organizational design. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The primary objective of this thesis was to investigate Napoleon Bonaparte’s 
command and control of the Grand Armee through the lens of organizational design.  
Napoleon’s methodology behind the design of the Grand Armee has been analyzed using 
modern principles of organizational design.  The structure that Napoleon created was a 
vast information network that served as the framework for a highly effective command 
and control system.  Napoleon dominated the war within the information domain leaving 
his enemies guessing about his next move.  The Grand Armee transited the European 
countryside with lightning speed as Napoleon out maneuvered his enemies time and time 
again.  Napoleon’s dominance was a direct result of his organizational masterpiece that 
was the Grand Armee.  From an organizational design perspective, Napoleon’s 
methodology applied the ideas of others and exploited existing technology to affect his 
design. 
The reorganization of the military corps became one of the most important 
transformations made by Napoleon.  Using an innovative organizational design, his 
strategy combined divisions of infantry, artillery, and cavalry.  This created smaller, self-
contained armies within the greater Grand Armee.  The army corps was considered a key 
component in Napoleon’s strategic deployments.  Napoleon had created a military 
philosophy of march divided and fight united.  This strategy masked his intentions to his 
enemies as well as eased the strain of logistics. 
Analyzing Napoleon’s design from a modern perspective of organizational theory 
creates an opportunity to illustrate key principles of organizational design.  First, 
Napoleon created a unity of command within his information network.  The upper 
echelon of his command structure consisted of each corps individual marshal, Marshal 
Berthier, and finally Napoleon.  Napoleon was the final authority on all decisions.  
Second, the army corps’ functionality required a specialized workforce.  This 
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organizational principle is called division of labor.  Napoleon used his early build up for 
the invasion of England to develop and train his workforce in Northern France. 
Napoleon’s design for the corps included his command and control element.  It 
contained a staff corps to function similar to the General Staff, scaled to the level of 
command.  The staff network was paramount to the success of Napoleon’s information 
system.  With the help of his Chief of Staff, Marshal Berthier, Napoleon enforced 
standardization throughout his command network.  This standardization included a highly 
effective messaging system that allowed Napoleon to operate as the apex of his 
organization.  Although Napoleon was the apex, he was able to decentralize many of his 
command functions by creating a staff capable of handling the information traffic.  The 
information flow was controlled by Berthier.  Information flowed through a system of 
couriers and utilized developing technology such as Chappe’s semaphore telegraph. 
The information system that was part of Napoleon’s organizational design also 
depended on non-military organizations as well.  The creation of Imperial Headquarters 
allowed Napoleon to delegate matters of state as well as military engagements.   
The Intelligence Bureau gathered and collected information from its espionage 
network of spies and agents working for French ambassadors throughout Europe.  They 
were also responsible for translating foreign newspapers as well as monitoring the 
political intrigue within Paris.  A successful intelligence network is paramount in 
determining an army’s ability to wage war (Jomini, 1862/2007).  Napoleon’s C2 network 
relied heavily on intelligence concerning enemy force concentrations and movements.  
Strategic deployment and destination of the Grand Armee depended on the target 
Napoleon selected from this intelligence. 
Three historical battles were presented as evidence to the effectiveness of 
Napoleon’s organizational design.  These battles emphasize Napoleon’s ability to 
outmaneuver his enemies through command and control.  Napoleon created a 
decentralized command structure that allowed him to maintain overall control of the 
Grand Armee.  This structure delegated command to his corps commanders who operated 
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autonomously to carry out Napoleon’s operational orders.  The level of knowledge that 
the Marshals maintained of Napoleon’s strategic plan helped facilitate Napoleon’s C2 by 
decreasing the burden of information flow.  
The maneuver on Ulm demonstrated the speed and efficiency with which 
Napoleon’s command and control structure operated.  By exercising his philosophy to 
march divided and fight united, Napoleon executed a double envelopment around the city 
of Ulm.  This envelopment trapped the Austrian forces under General Mack forcing his 
surrender without any major military engagement.  This move was made possible through 
utilization of many facets of Napoleon’s information network within his organization.  
Napoleon relied on his spy network to report Austrian troop movements.  He utilized his 
cavalry units under Marshal Murat to screen his troop movements.  Napoleon’s 
diplomatic efforts created an alliance among the Bavarian princes which kept open his 
lines of communication back to France. 
At Austerlitz, Napoleon was outnumbered and forced to attack his enemies while 
their forces were divided.  By dividing his forces, Napoleon created the image that he 
was weak and vulnerable to attack.  Tsar Alexander I of Russia against the advice of his 
general advanced on Napoleon’s position at Austerlitz.  The advantages created from 
Napoleon’s ruse were demonstrated through the effectiveness of Napoleon’s command 
and control.  Napoleon was able to dispatch orders to his corps commanders in a timely 
fashion.  This allowed them to arrive in force exactly where Napoleon needed them once 
the engagement had ensued.  This was arguably Napoleon’s greatest military 
masterpiece. 
The restructuring of the corps within the Grand Armee was instrumental in the 
ability of Napoleon to wage war.  The battles at Ulm and Austerlitz demonstrate the ease 
with which Napoleon could navigate his corps around the battlefield as well as the 
information domain.  The situational awareness created within Napoleon’s organization 
greatly reduced the strain on his command and control element.  In contrast, Archduke 
Charles maintained a more centralized command structure.  He was constantly 
repositioning his units on the battlefield because he had a habit of not informing his 
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subordinate commanders of his intentions.  This created a much greater strain on his C2 
element and increased the amount of time he needed to respond to tactical maneuvers 
against his positions. 
Napoleon Bonaparte engineered a highly effective, well organized, and extremely 
motivated fighting force.  The success of the Grand Armee depended on the efficiency of 
the C2 network that Napoleon’s organizational design provided.  Analysis of Napoleon’s 
command and control of the Grand Armee through the lens of organizational design 
revealed many things.  Napoleon had an understanding of concepts in organizational 
design that would not be realized until they became areas of study in the twentieth 
century.  By restructuring the corps de armee, Napoleon was able to create smaller self-
contained armies within the collective of the Grand Armee.   
Napoleon understood that dividing his forces when deploying for war would 
require an effective C2 network to bring them all back together again at the appropriate 
time.  Therefore, his command and control network within each corps consisted of a 
Marshal and his staff corps.  The staff corps was designed to operate as a smaller scale 
model of Napoleon’s General Staff.  The General Staff under Marshal Berthier acted as 
Napoleon’s central hub for information flow within his organization. 
Napoleon as organizational designer placed himself at the center of his 
organization and C2 network.  He was the central processor or brains of the organization 
and all decisions were made by Napoleon.  It was Napoleon in the end who managed the 
day to day operations of the Grand Armee, and the reason continuity and standardization 
was maintained throughout his organization.  It was the organizational design of the 
Grand Armee that facilitated a C2 network capable of dominating France’s enemies. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
In deed much of the success of the Grand Armee was dependent on Napoleon’s 
ability to manage his vast organization that continued to grow in the years after 1809.  
Many scholars and historians argue that the sheer size of the Grand Armee became too 
much for one man to control resulting in Napoleon’s failures at Leipzig, Moscow, and 
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finally at Waterloo (Van Creveld, 1985).  Although countless work has been written on 
Napoleon, there is still a myriad of questions waiting to be researched. 
Napoleon created a successful organizational design for the land components of 
the Grand Armee.  He was never able to establish control of the sea.  His victory at Ulm 
was immediately followed up by the defeat of his fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar by Lord 
Nelson and the British fleet.  His inability to gain a foothold at sea kept him from 
invading England.  How did his lack of sea power affect the organizational design of the 
Grand Armee? 
The Grand Armee was a highly effective fighting force that Napoleon guided 
through many engagements.  The corps system he created was designed to act 
autonomously once given a desired set of plans or instructions from Napoleon.  The 
success rate of Napoleon’s armies without his presence in theater was dismal at best.  The 
peninsula campaign against Spain in 1808-1809 was highlighted by a massive 
counterinsurgency from the Spanish population.  How did this counterinsurgency manage 
to disrupt Napoleon’s information and command and control network?   
Finally, Napoleon’s organizational design, information network, and tactics 
became a legacy that was adopted by many military leaders.  The works of Clausewitz 
and Jomini were influenced by their close proximity to the Napoleonic wars.  The 
Prussian General Staff was based on the model of Napoleon’s General Staff.  General 
Robert E. Lee employed many of Napoleon’s strategies during the American Civil War.  
How were these legacies affected by the Industrial Revolution? 
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